St. Thomas Aquinas on Prudence
Summa Theologiae IIaIIae QQ.47-55

The Quasi-Integral Parts of Prudence Q.49


MEMORY	Aristotle: 1. Memory is in the sensitive part of the soul, and prudence is in the rational part of the soul. Hence memory is not part of prudence. 2. Prudence is acquired and perfected through practice. Memory is in us by nature. 3. Memory is of things past while prudence looks at things to be done in the future.	Cicero: 1. Aristotle said intellectual virtue is produced and developed by time and experience. Experience is stocked with memories. Recalling many facts is required for prudence. 2. Memory is not developed by nature alone. It must be practiced with art and diligence and can be mastered with motivation and conditioning; like a science.
INSIGHT	1. Insight and prudence are both subdivisions of intellectual virtue, one cannot be part of the other, they are equals. 2. Insight is one of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, hence is treated complimentary to faith. Prudence is distinct from faith, so insight cannot be a feature of it. 3. Prudence deals with individual actions; while understanding is of universal and non-material things. So understanding is not a part of prudence.	Cicero/Macrobius: 1. Every rational deduction starts from initial data, so every reasoned process should begin with something which is in understood. Since prudence is right reason derived from insight, so understanding is part of prudence. 2. Reasoning involved in prudence relies on a double understanding: (a) understanding of general principles in theory and in practice (b) understanding of particular principle of practice. So the insight or understanding in prudence is a correct appreciation of some particular end like sharpsight into things divine. 3. The correct appreciation of a particular end (about a principle) is called understanding (about a particular) is sense or internal sensibility where by we judge particular facts.
TEACHABLENESS	1. The components of each virtue must be individually present as a component in all of the virtues, so that one set of components applies to all virtues. Teachableness does not follow suit, for example one cannot be taught courage. 2. The qualities of human virtues lie in the power of individual humans and not in the power of someone else to each us. 3. Docility is for learners. Yet prudence, since it is perceptive, seems rather for teachers also called preceptors. Docility is not a feature of prudence. So the teachables are not a feature of prudence.	Macrobius/Plotinus: 1. Prudence deals with particular matters of action, infinite in their variety. One person cannot consider them all sufficiently. So teachableness is necessary and teachableness and docility are both included in prudence. 2. Teachableness is an aid in each and every virtue. However, in prudence it is very notably pronounced. 3. A prudent man commands not only others, but also of himself. Prudence is a feature present when commanding and when being commanded, for each man and his role changes. Docility is, therefore, present in his prudence.
ACUMEN (Swiftly spotting the middle term in an argument; readiness at mind; alertness; flair for finding the right course in sudden encounters; shrewdness.)	1. Acumen is shown in swiftly spotting the middle term in demonstrations. Reasoning in prudence is not demonstrative, since it is about contingent facts. Therefore it is not a characteristic of prudence. 2. Well-advisedness is a mark of prudence. Acumen does not enter into being well-advised, for it is an inspired guess, arrived at rapidly and without reasoning. 3. Acumen shows itself in conjectural inferences, and these are employed by rhetoricians. So it belongs to detorie rather than to prudence.	Isidore: 1. Acumen hits the point not only in demonstrations, but also in practical issues. For example, Aristotles instance of a man divining that the friendship of two people sprang from a common enmity. In this way it is part of prudence. 2. Good counsel or well-advisednessis not the same as shrewdness. A man may be of good counsel even though he deliberates slow and at length, differing from shrewdness. Quickness is necessary for a possible state of emergency. 3. Acumen is not part of rhetoric because it is not taken here in the sense of the conjectures of rhetoricians, but applies whenever men dispute about the truth, making it part of prudence.
FORESIGHT	Isidore: 1. Nothing is part of itself. A person is called prudent because they look ahead, so prudence and prevision seem to be one in the same. 2. Prudence is severely practical, whereas foresight can also be theoretical. So while prudence is exercised, foresight is more theory than practice. 3. The chief act of prudence is to command, its secondary acts are to deliberate and decide. None of these is implied in the notion of prevision.	Cicero/Macrobius: 1. Only those future contingents which a man can shape to the purpose of human life are matters for prudence. Both contingency and purpose are implied in the notion of human providence (looking ahead to something distant to which present occurrences are to be adapted). Accordingly foresight is part of prudence. 2. Prevision is principle among the components of prudence, for all the others are necessary in order that a deed be rightly directed to an end. When a single thing is composed of many parts, one of these must be dominant and give unity to the whole. 3. Theory is occupied with universal and necessary truths, which are not remote, but constant and pervasive. Theory may appear distant to those whose knowledge halts short of theories. Foresight properly refers to matters of practice, not of theory.
REASONED JUDGEMENT	Aristotle: 1. The seat of a quality is not a part of that quality. Reasoning power is the seat of prudence, therefore it is not itself part of prudence. 2. What is common to many should not be counted a part of anyone. If it is then it should be credited to the one it features most pronouncedly. Reason is in all the intellectual virtues, above all in wisdom and scientific knowledge therefore it should not be credited to prudence. 3. Reason is not essentially different from the understanding. If understanding (or insight) is part of prudence, it is redundant an unnecessary to add reason.	Macrobius/Plotinus: 1. According to the Ethics, to furnish good advice is an office of prudence. Being advised implies casting about from point to point; this is done by reasoning. So the prudent man should be a good reasoner. Components are qualities necessary for complete prudence. Therefore, the quality of good reasoning is a component. 2. Prudence requires that general principles be rightly applied to particular issues which are various and uncertain. Reasoning is used to ascertain which principles shall be applied to which issues, and therefore is a necessary part of prudence.
CIRCUMSPECTION (careful attention to circumstances of a moral act)	1. Such circumstances are numberless and not within the grasp of reason, which is the seat of prudence. Therefore, circumspection is not an integral part of prudence. 2. Circumstances, and their significance seems to be more an issue of moral virtue than intellectual virtue. 3. If foresight is a component of prudence, then circumstances play a minor role. With foresight one is able to see things far off, and this allows an advantage with immediate surroundings, since the future soon becomes the present. Therefore, it is seen as contradictory for prudence to have both foresight and circumspection as integral parts.	Macrobius: 1. The main function of prudence is to order things well for an end of purpose. This can be done only when the end is good, and the means are good, and well adapted to the end. But prudence is about individual actions which involve many factors. So a means good and suitable in the abstract becomes inopportune due to a combination of circumstances. Prudence calls for circumspection in order that what is done for an end may match the circumstances of the situation. 2. Prudence is the principle deciding which circumstances are morally relevant, for the intellectual virtues. Circumstances are related to the moral virtues in that the moral virtues are achieved in those set circumstances.
CAUTION	1. Matters which cannot admit of evil do not call for caution. No one uses virtue as ill. Therefore caution should be no part of prudence. 2. Medicine brings health and cures illness both to provide good and shun evil. To provide good is for prudence, therefore to shun evil is also for prudence. So caution should not be counted apart from prevision. 3. No prudent person strives for the impossible. To take precautions against all ills which can befall would be impossible. Hence, caution is not a part of prudence.	1. Prudence deals with contingent actions (where bad may be mixed with good). This is because human deeds are multiform, and wrongs can wear the air of good. So caution is necessary if right courses are to be followed. 2. A distinction is drawn between caution and foresight; pursuing good objects and shunning their opposing evils are one and the same interest. To shun advantageous obstacles introduces another interest, and makes necessary the distinction between caution and foresight as two distinct components of prudence.